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BOOK REVIEW
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: FACING REAL PROBLEMS AND
FINDING REAL SOLUTIONS
A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION, by Paul C. Weiler,
Howard H. Hiatt, Joseph P Newhouse, William G. Johnson,
Troyen A. Brennan, and Lucian L. Leape. Harvard University
Press, 1993. Pp. 178. $29.95
MICHAEL J. SAKS*
Medical accidents kill more than three times as many people
each year as do auto accidents1 and produce many more perma,
nent total or near-total disabilities than do workplace accidents.2
Few victims of negligent medical injury-only between three to
seven percent-bring any claim for compensation.3 Of those who
bring valid claims, at least in the eyes of the defendants' insurers,
half do not prevail at trial.4 Economic compensation generally falls
below the injury victim's actual losses. The interval from injury to
compensation averages six years in the State of New York, and
those with the most serious injuries typically wait over a decade.
* Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. Ph.D., Ohio State University, 1975;
M.S.L., Yale Law School, 1983. My thanks go to Howard Larsen for his unfailing research
assistance.
1. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 55 (1993). As dreadful as these numbers may seem,
the problem could be several times worse. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
2. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 56.
3. Id. at 73-74.
4. Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's Shadow, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 43, 50 (1991).
5. Frank A. Sloan & Chee R. Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the
Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 997, 1019 (1990) (finding "that a 1 percent in-
crease in loss yields about a 0.1 to 0.2 percent increase in compensation on average").
6. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
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These conclusions are only a select few from a sizable body of
research conducted in recent years. ' The study reported in A Mea-
sure of Malpractice is one of the most ambitious and important to
date. Ironically, the motivation behind this and other studies
comes in great part from the medical community itself and its vo-
ciferous complaints that the tort system has imposed excessive and
unjust burdens on malpractice defendants.8 In an effort to measure
the extent of the problem of malpractice litigation, the research
discovered instead a massive problem of malpractice and the ap-
parent ineffectiveness of tort law to address it.'
Rather than moving to protect the public from such massive
harm, legislative reforms of the past two decades have been aimed
at shielding health care providers, especially doctors, from the
principal legal device designed to deal with accidental injuries,
thereby assuring that injuries and deaths remain high and compen-
sation inadequate. 10 How could so remarkable a gap grow between
widespread belief (and legislation), on the one hand, and the real-
ity of the situation, on the other'? No doubt many reasons worked
together, but surely one of them was the lack of good and accessi-
ble data to throw real light on the problem." "[G]overnments
7. See, e.g., PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1985); DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE
UNITED STATES (1991); Stephen Danels, Tracing the Shadow of the Law: Jury Verdicts in
Medical Malpractice Cases, 14 JUST. Sys. J. 4 (1990). For a discussion of these and other
studies, see Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
8. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 1 (noting that the State of New York directed a medi-
cal liability study because "a sense of crisis enveloped the malpractice system as premiums
were skyrocketing").
9. Id. at 73 ("[T]he odds that a potentially legitimate tort claim will be brought" are
small.).
10. Id. at 76.
11. The body of knowledge about malpractice and malpractice litigation contains many
gaps which allow numerous alternative interpretations and likely misinterpretations of the
applicable data. See Saks, supra note 7, at 1169-70; Michael J. Saks, Malpractice Miscon-
ceptions and Other Lessons About the Litigation System, 16 JUST. Sys. J. 7, 19 (1993)
("[T]hese findings could support a variety of conclusions and, in turn, a variety of re-
forms."). For example, if the number of claims has risen over time, that rise could reflect
increased "litigiousness" in the society. But in the alternative, it could reflect any one or
more of the following changes: more malpractice, more medical care (for with more care
come more occasions for error), more access to health care (as more people gain access to
medical care, more occasions for instances of malpractice arise), an aging population (a
larger number of older people combined with the fact that malpractice occurs disproportion-
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should know something about the real world of medical injury and
malpractice litigation before they enact reforms that profoundly
affect the fates of patients, doctors, and lawyers for decades to
come."' 2 That shortcoming now has been reduced considerably 13
The book under review summarizes the origins, animating issues,
methods, findings, and conclusions of the Harvard Medical Prac-
tice Study,14 one of the most important studies among the body of
serious research on the subject of medical malpractice and mal-
practice litigation. The majority of the research reported in A
Measure of Malpractice has appeared earlier in a lengthy technical
report'15 and numerous journal articles,' 6 although a few of the
analyses included in the book are refinements over previous re-
ports. This book represents the most public, most accessible, and
most coherent statement of the Harvard project, its findings, and
its conclusions. Although parts of the book are tough analytical
sledding,' 7 I encourage the less statistically literate reader to stick
with the book's text and not to worry unduly about the tables of
ately among older patients leads to more cases of malpractice), improved case selection by
lawyers (more serious malpractice cases taken m place of less serious types of cases), and so
on.
12. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 152; cf. TERESA A. SULLIVAN ETr AL., As WE FORGIVE
OuR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AmERICA 336 (1989) ("To advocate law
reforms without a shred of evidence about how the system currently works, who is likely to
be affected, and how those effects may reverberate throughout the system is breathtakingly
negligent."); OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 192 (3d ed. 1979) ("It is a capital mistake
to theorize before one has data.") (quoting SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE MEMOIRS OF
SHERLOCK HOLMES (1983)).
13. Historians of law and policy will marvel not only at the legislative misdirection, but at
the media's failure to report the story, even after hard evidence had displaced the anec-
dotes. To their credit, major medical journals, along with social science, law, and economics
journals, have published many of the studies. See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan et al., The Na-
ture of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients-Results of the Harvard Medical Practice
Study II, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 377 (1991); Frank A. Sloan et al., Medical Malpractice
Experience of Physicians: Predictable or Haphazard, 262 JAMA 3291 (1989).
14. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAwYERS: MEDICAL IN-
JURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK, THE REPORT OF
THE HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY TO THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1990).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Saks, supra note 7, at 1178-79. Many of these articles appeared m the New
England Journal of Medicine and the Journal of the American Medical Association.
17. Notwithstanding some of the dust cover's assurances to the contrary. Moreover, some
of the book's tables would draw a scolding from statistics or social science journal editors for
their avoidable opacity.
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multiple logistic regression analyses and probit models. Even these
readers will emerge with a powerful education about the problem
of medical malpractice and malpractice litigation.
ORIGINS OF THE PROJECT
Several of the most interesting lessons taught by A Measure of
Malpractice can be found in the project's birth. When debate be-
gan to emerge over medical malpractice litigation in 1984, the
deans of the Harvard School of Public Health and the Harvard
Law School invited several of their colleagues to form the Harvard
Medical Practice Study Group to conduct an interdisciplinary
analysis of medical malpractice problems with a goal of recom-
mending solutions. The group's composition" and their enterprise
changed over time. The Study Group's members debated with each
other for more than a year. Then
it dawned on us that we were mired in these controversies be-
cause we suffered from the same information gap that was af-
flicting legislators and courts asked to choose from this policy
menu. The case for these proposals rested almost entirely on an-
ecdotal evidence, too easily tailored to the predispositions of the
protagonist.
Eventually we concluded that as scholars in a university, our
responsibility and our comparative advantage lay in doing the
kind of research that could fill this yawning gap in the malprac-
tice debate. Accordingly, we mapped out an ambitious study
that for the first time would come to grips with all the major
facets of this problem Only after immersing ourselves in
this process of empirical discovery and analysis would we be in a
position to offer our views about how to improve the law's treat-
ment of medical care.' 9
The realization that solid evidence is a necessary ingredient of
good policy comes far more readily to empirical scientists of all
kinds than to lawyers and legal scholars. Nevertheless, legal schol-
18. The book's authors include scholars from the fields of law (Paul C. Weiler), medicine
(Howard H. Hiatt), health policy and management (Joseph P Newhouse), health economics
(William G. Johnson), and public health (Troyen A. Brennan and Lucian L. Leape).
19. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at vii-viii.
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ars continually have rediscovered this in many areas of legal
policy 20
The group's proposed study was suggested to officials in govern-
ment and organized medicine in Massachusetts, the obvious site
for the research. The officials rebuffed the offer because a malprac-
tice reform bill supported by both the Governor and the medical
society was pending in the legislature.2' Apparently waiting for re-
search to provide necessary answers risked confusing the
lawmakers with the facts, and certainly would delay the adoption
of a law they already were poised to approve.22 The State of New
York, especially the office of the Commissioner of Health, which
apparently felt a strong need for more solid answers, welcomed the
study and committed $4 million to finance it.
23
THE STUDY
The core of the study involved review of the medical records of
approximately 31,000 patients treated in fifty-one New York hospi-
tals during 1984.24 The hospitals were a representative sample of
the state's acute-care, nonpsychiatric hospitals.25 The study care-
fully oversampled high-risk patients and undersampled low-risk
patients, and weighted them so that the sampled cases could be
extrapolated to the state's 2.6 million hospital patients that year.26
The records were screened by medical records analysts trained
to identify possible "adverse events," defined as "unintended or
20. See, e.g., DAvID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990); DAVID L. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT
OF CHILD SUPPORT (1979); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 13.
21. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at viii-iX.
22. Id. The landscape of malpractice reform is littered with examples of legislation that
did not work. See Saks, supra note 11, at 17-18 (reviewing studies of malpractice litigation
reforms that failed). On the other hand, no single project provides all the answers, and
policy virtually always must be made in the face of some uncertainty. The problem in the
tort reform area has been that confident assertions so often have turned out, when the seri-
ous research came in, to be at so great a distance from reality that the facts certainly would
have been worth waiting for.
23. This sum is not excessive, considering the problem consumes $1 billion annually in
insurance premiums in the State of New York. WEILER UP AL., supra note 1, at ix.
24. Id.
25. The researchers and the State succeeded in gaming the cooperation of every one of
the hospitals selected for the study. Id. at x-xi.
26. Id. at 40.
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unexpected harmful consequences of medical intervention. '27
Those adverse events found were then reviewed by at least two
physicians who again assessed the injury, judged whether the in-
jury was attributable to negligence 28 and if so the gravity of the
negligence, and evaluated the disability level caused by the injury
Disagreements were resolved by one of six senior physicians on the
project.29
In addition to analyzing hospital records, the Harvard Study re-
viewed insurance records of malpractice claims in the state in or-
der to assess the correspondence between negligent injuries suf-
fered and claims filed.30 Finally, the project conducted interviews
with 739 doctors, to learn about their experience with and percep-
tions of malpractice and malpractice litigation 1 and with 3,341 pa-
tients, many of whom the project had determined to be malprac-
tice victims.32
Although confidential reviews of records and aggregation of data
(with no personal identifiers) are accepted ways of conducting re-
search while protecting the privacy of individuals, the interview
phase of the study did present an ethical dilemma. Because the
great majority of those who suffered negligent injuries had not filed
27. Id. at 34-35.
28. "A negligent adverse event was the consequence of treatment that failed to meet the
standard of the average medical practitioner in the field." Id. at 35.
29. Id. at 41. The fact of disagreement is itself worth noting. Medical malpractice may be
one of the most difficult areas of torts in which to attribute injuries to negligence. While an
injury in itself will alert the driver of a car or the user of a tool that something is amiss, a
medical patient is less likely to know whether an injury is unexpected and, if so, whether it
is due to physician error. Marlynn L. May, Aggrieved Patients' Journeys to Justice: Self-
Help Networks Among Suers and Non-Suers 4 (June 26-29, 1991) (unpublished paper
presented at the joint meeting of the Law and Society Association and the Research Com-
mittee on the Sociology of Law of the International Sociological Association, on file with the
author) (finding that before filing a claim, injured patients typically consult family, friends,
and professionals, including doctors, in an effort to understand the cause of their condition
and decide what action to take, if any). From the Harvard Study, it is obvious that even
physicians have difficulty deciding when an injury is due to negligence. See WEILER ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 41 (noting differences of opinion between the screeners of the medical
records). This has implications that the authors seem to have overlooked. See infra notes
115-23 and accompanying text.
30. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 38.
31. Id. at 118.
32. Id. at 83. Apparently, however, no family members of deceased patients were
interviewed.
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claims, the project's interviewers would be talking to people who
had suffered negligent injuries, some of whom were left seriously
disabled by those injuries, and who might still bring a claim. Hos-
pital officials conditioned their cooperation with the study on a
promise not to reveal anything to the interviewees that would alert
them to the fact that they probably had a valid malpractice claim
on which they never had acted.8 This presented the researchers
with an interesting dilemma. Could they ethically extract informa-
tion from former patients about their injuries, disabilities, suffer-
ing, and economic losses, and in exchange for their cooperation,
never reveal to the interviewees the true reason for the interest in
them?34 The book does not discuss the full analysis of this ethical
dilemma, if one was undertaken, and the fact that the study was
conducted is sufficient to tell the reader in which direction it was
resolved.35
BASIC FINDINGS
This Section summarizes the basic findings and conclusions of
the research reported in A Measure of Malpractice. Subsequent
sections comment on various aspects of the research, the findings,
and their implications.
33. Id. at xi-xii.
34. Rather than informing people they were the source of information for a study of mal-
practice, they were told the study was about "the economic consequences of hospitaliza-
tion." Id. at xii.
35. If one finds it ethically impermissible to take information from people without telling
them the real purpose for which the information is being sought, and thus failing to obtain
or even seek their informed consent for participation in the study, then those portions of the
study requiring interviews will not be done. But the requirement of informed consent for
research participation is not absolute. Where the risks to the participant are minimal, as in
verbal interviews and surveys, the requirements of informed consent are lessened. See 45
C.F.R. § 46.101(b) (1992); see alsoNational Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342
(1974); NATIONAL COMM'N FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTs OF RESEARCH, US. DEP'T
HEALTH, Enuc. & WELFARE, PUB. No. OS 78-0012, BELMoNT REPOR. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJEcTs OF RESEARCH 12 (1978). Moreover,
from a utilitarian perspective, the particular malpractice victims are equally well off
whether the study is not done at all or is done and they are deceived about the true reasons
for their participation. If the study is done, however, future malpractice victims (potentially
including the respondents themselves) may benefit from law and policy based on these
findings.
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Medical Accidents and Negligence
Adverse events occurred for 3.7% of patients or nearly 99,000
New York hospital patients in 1984.386 More than a quarter of those
adverse events were due to negligence.3 7 In other words, approxi-
mately one percent of hospital patients, more than 27,000 people,
were victims of medical malpractice.'3 Of that number, nearly half,
more than 12,000, involved minimal injury and the victims recov-
ered within one month, while three percent, or nearly 900 victims,
suffered major permanent disability "I And twenty-five percent of
the victims, about 6,900 individuals, died as a result of the mal-
practice.40 Generally speaking, the more serious the injury, the
more likely it was to have been caused by negligence. For example,
as the accompanying Table 1,1 reprinted from the book, shows,
while only twenty-two percent of the 56,042 minimal injuries were
due to negligence, fifty-one percent of the 13,451 deaths were.42
36. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 43-44.
37. Id. at 43.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 44.
40. Id.
41. See Table 1, infra.
42. WEILER r AL., supra note 1, at 44 (Table 3.2 reproduced herein as Table 1).
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Table 1. Disability caused by adverse events, based on 1984 New York State population
estimates.
Adverse Negligent Adverse events
events adverse events due to negligence
Disability No. % No. % %
Minimal, recovery 56,042 57 12,428 46 22
1 month
Moderate, recovery 13,521 14 3,302 12 24
1-6 months
Moderate, recovery 2,762 3 817 3 30
> 6 months
Permanent, 1-50% 3,807 4 869 3 23
disability
Permanent, > 50% 2,550 3 877 3 34
disability
Death 13,451 14 6,895 25 51
Not determinable 6,477 7 1,989 7 31
Total* 98,610 100 27,177 100 28
* Totals differ from sums reported above because of rounding errors.
The authors extended their New York findings to the nation:
If New York's adverse-event-related death total can be extrapo-
lated to the U.S. population as a whole, one would estimate over
150,000 iatrogenic fatalities annually, more than half of which
are due to negligence. Medical injury, then, accounts for more
deaths than all other types of accidents combined, and dwarfs
the mortality rates associated with motor vehicle accidents
(50,000 deaths per year) and occupation-related mishaps (6,000
deaths per year). 43
A better index of the riskiness of medical treatment was the
number of permanent and total or near-total disabilities. Severe
nonfatal injuries from medical management numbered 2,500 in
New York State, which would be equivalent to more than 30,000
victims nationally, a total greatly in excess of comparable disa-
bilities from the job 44
43. Id. at 55 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 56.
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In addition, the researchers treated the observed malpractice
like other sources of disease or injury, and carried out analyses to
better understand the epidemiology of medical injury' 5 Those
analyses might prove helpful to risk management specialists in ef-
forts to reduce the incidence of such injuries.
Claims Filed
Across the State of New York, claims for compensation rose
from six per one hundred physicians in 1976 to seven per one hun-
dred in 1984.4' The important question, of course, is how the num-
ber of claims compares with the number of negligent injuries or
adverse events. The study accomplished the comparison using sev-
eral procedures, including matching the negligent injuries found by
the review of hospital records to filings with malpractice insurers.4 7
The analysis revealed that for every seven to eight patients who
suffered a negligent injury, one claim was filed.48
It is informative to disaggregate this ratio, because while not
every victim of negligent injury filed a claim, not every claim filed
was by a patient judged in the records review to have suffered a
negligent injury 49 As Table 2 shows, in their sample of over 30,000
patients, forty-seven filed malpractice claims, but only eight of
45. Id. at 33. Greater age and lack of health insurance were the major risk factors associ-
ated with patients who became victims of malpractice. Id. at 47. More negligence occurred
in hospitals with higher percentages of minority patients. Id. at 51. A much smaller percent-
age of adverse events was attributable to malpractice in university teaching hospitals and
proprietary hospitals. Id. at 50-51.
46. Id. at 69. Using data only from the two largest physician insurers, whose msureds
were most actively engaged in practice, the rates are 11 per 100 in 1976 and 13 per 100 in
1984. Id.
47. Id. at 67.
48. Id. at 70.
49. Id. at 71. Table 2 was constructed from data presented m Chapter 4 of the book. It
clarifies the comparison between those patients who have negligent injuries and those who
do not, and what actions they take. Id. at 77-109. For every patient with a negligent adverse
event who files a claim, there are almost five additional claims filed by patients who did not
suffer negligent injuries. Id. at 71. But Table 2 makes other interpretations of those data
apparent. Of a total of 280 negligent adverse events, eight claims were filed. Id. at 72. Of
29,841 cases in which the study found no negligent adverse event, 39 claims were filed. Id.
Put differently, 2.9% of negligent adverse events were detected and claims filed; no claims
were filed for 99.9% of the nonnegligent adverse events. And the comparison between valid
claims not brought (272) and invalid claims brought (39) becomes patent, a ratio of seven to
one.
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those had, by the study's reckoning, suffered from negligent medi-
cal injuries. 50 This meant that the gap between negligent injuries
suffered and claims brought would be closer to one in fifty than to
one m seven or eight. Other considerations led the authors to con-
clude that the actual ratio of false negatives (negligently injured
patients who bring no claim) most likely fell somewhere between
one claim in fifteen instances of malpractice and one in thirty 51
In addition to false negative errors, the study also revealed in-
stances of false positive errors-doctors who had not inflicted neg-
ligent injuries but who nonetheless had claims filed against them.
The ratio of false positives to true positives was nearly five to one
(thirty-nine to eight).52
Table 2. Medical Accidents and Claims.
Claim Filed?
No Yes
Negligent Adverse Event 272 8 280
No Negligent Adverse 29802 39 29841
Event
30074 47 30121
Putting the two kinds of errors together, as we can see from Ta-
ble 2, the ratio of erroneous filings to erroneous non-filings is about
one to seven (thirty-nine to 272).51 That is, for every doctor or hos-
pital against whom an invalid claim is filed, there are seven valid
claims that go unfiled.
The authors conclude:
[A] common physicians' complaint about malpractice litigation
is that it is both excessive and erratic. Our investigation of the
incidence and distribution of litigation in New York demon-
strates that while the legal system does in fact operate errati-
cally, it hardly operates excessively.54
50. Id. at 72.
51. Id. at 74-75.
52. Id. at 71.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 73. I have doubts that the data support the charge of "erratic." A closer look
suggests much the reverse. See infra notes 109-23 and accompanying text.
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Our litigation study demonstrates a far greater gap than we had
expected between tortious injuries inflicted on patients in hospi-
tals and tort claims filed against health care providers. [W]e
found several times as many seriously disabled patients who re-
ceived no legal redress for their injury as innocent doctors who
bore the burden of defending against unwarranted malpractice
claims. 55
Patient Losses and Compensation
This portion of the book focuses on the additional losses im-
posed on patients due to medical accidents-that is, costs above
and beyond those arising from the underlying illness or injury
which occasioned hospitalization and treatment.5 6 This analysis
was accomplished by using two alternative methods, both building
on a comparison of medically-injured patients with similar but
nonmedically-injured patients.51 The total of the compensable
costs due to medical accidents came to about $3.77 billion in
1984-$1.8 billion in additional medical care and $1.96 billion in
lost earnings and household production.5
Because this analysis was aimed at testing whether the authors'
proposed no-fault compensation system is economically feasible,
the authors had little interest in separating the costs to the negli-
gently injured from those imposed upon all persons suffering ia-
trogenic injuries. They also had little interest in evaluating the ad-
equacy of payments made under the existing tort system.59
When these losses are adjusted for taxes, consumption pay-
ments, employment-related lost income compensation, health in-
surance compensation, and a proposed six-month deductible pe-
riod, the total cost of medical injuries is reduced from $3.77 billion
to $964 million.60 To this figure must be added other costs of a no-
55. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 76.
56. Id. at 77-109.
57. Id. at 82-91.
58. Id. at 99.
59. But see Hensler, supra note 7, at 107 (finding that tort liability payments accounted
for only about seven percent of total compensation); Saks, supra note 7, at 1218-20 (summa-
rizing studies finding that the tort system overcompensates small losses, undercompensates
large losses, and on average undercompensates).
60. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 99.
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fault system, notably administrative costs, which the study esti-
mates at between thirty and thirty-five cents per dollar of claim.61
The sum would be the expected cost of the proposed no-fault plan.
By comparison, during the same period, the total cost of malprac-
tice premiums in New York State came to about $1 billion.2
The authors' proposed alternative malpractice compensation
system would compensate all injuries caused by medical interven-
tion (whether due to negligence or not), but only for injuries that
endure beyond a six-month deductible period, only for the incre-
ment due to the adverse event (that is, no coverage for the under-
lying illness or injury), only for costs that are not already covered
by other kinds of insurance, and provide nothing for pain, suffer-
ing, and loss of enjoyment of life. 3 As the numbers above indicate,
such a plan appears economically feasible. 4
Deterrence
For reasons that will be discussed later, and of which the authors
are aware, the deterrence analysis is methodologically the weakest
part of the study and the findings should be regarded as commen-
surately tentative. Nevertheless, this Section will summarize the
study's basic findings.
Physicians overestimated by a factor of three the likelihood that
a suit will be filed. They estimated that 19.5 suits were filed per
100 physicians,6 5 while the actual rate was 6.6 per 100.66 While doc-
tors in all specialties overestimated the risks of suit,67 the overesti-
mates of those in the low-risk specialties were the most exagger-
ated and those in the high-risk specialties the least exaggerated. 8
61. Id. at 106. The comparable transaction costs for the existing medical malpractice sys-
tem are estimated at 55 cents to the dollar and for workers' compensation at 20 cents. Id.
62. Id. at ix.
63. Id. at 101, 106-07.
64. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
65. WEILER r AL., supra note 1, at 124. I suspect the authors really mean claims. Not all
filed claims are born as or become lawsuits.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. Low-risk specialties included internal medicine and associated specialties; me-
dium-risk specialties included general surgery and associated specialties; high-risk special-
ties included orthopedic surgery, neurosurgery, and obstetrics. Id. at 117.
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Physicians believed that forty-five percent of adverse events and
sixty percent of negligent adverse events resulted in malpractice
claims.6 9 The most generous calculations of the actual proportions
are four percent and thirteen percent, respectively 70
There was "marked variation among physicians in their willing-
ness to label certain kinds of medical outcomes as iatrogenlc, and
an even more pronounced reluctance to label as negligent those
treatment decisions that, ex post at least, were clearly
erroneous."
7
'
1
In personal interviews, physicians "expressed great distress, even
anguish, over having their professional performance and compe-
tence attacked. '72 Physicians indicated that malpractice actions, or
fear of those actions, produced a number of changes in their prac-
tice patterns. In response, they ordered more tests and procedures,
and reduced either the number of patients or the range of their
services.7 3
The survey of a large number of physicians revealed that the
effect of possible malpractice litigation on standards of care was
judged by them to be on a par with clinical care rules, guidelines,
and standard operating procedures developed by clinical depart-
ments and hospitals-considerably lower than continuing medical
education and medical journals and considerably higher than ex-
ternal organized peer review 74 Personal interviews, by contrast,
suggested that potential malpractice actions were rated lower,
along with external peer review and state boards of discipline.7 5
The most important analysis, which estimated the effect of a
host of variables on the proportion of adverse events that were
69. Id. at 125.
70. Id. It is interesting to note that even physicians recognize that far fewer than all neg-
ligently caused injuries result in claims, and thus that the tort system's lack of vigilance
favors injurers over the injured, even though the physicians' estimate is more than four
times greater than the actual probability of a claim resulting from negligent injury. Id.
71. Id. at 125.
72. Id. at 126.
73. Id. at 127. Yet the data suggest that the size of the effect is quite modest, with rela-
tive odds of only 1.04 and 1.01, respectively, for those seeing the risks of suit as higher
versus lower. This seems to challenge much of the popular wisdom about physicians practic-
ing defensive medicine. Id.
74. Id. at 128.
75. Id. at 128-29.
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negligent, concluded that "the more malpractice suits that are
brought against the doctors and other providers in a particular
hospital, the fewer the number of negligent medical injuries that
will be suffered by patients in that hospital. 7 6 "The current level
of litigation intensity m New York appeared to be reducing the
negligent injury rate in our sample by 29 percent and overall
medical injuries by 11 percent
The Sections that follow comment on a number of issues raised
by the study, its findings, and their implications. I suspect that
much of what I write below will come as no revelation to any of the
authors of the book, but the book does not discuss them, and such
discussion may be helpful as we digest the work of the authors and
reflect on its implications.
How ACCURATE IS THE COUNT OF MEDICAL INJURIES?
The basic data accord roughly with the few similar studies that
have been conducted. The best known was sponsored by the Cali-
fornia Medical Association and the California Hospital Associa-
tion,78 which found about 0.8% of hospital patients were victims of
malpractice.79 The U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare conducted a similar study" and found that two percent of
patients suffered from negligent injuries."' The apparent differ-
ences among the studies could be due to time, place, research pro-
cedures, or other factors, and cannot be read as showing general
increases or decreases in the level of malpractice. The overall level
of rough agreement, however, cannot be taken to confirm anything
beyond that general agreement. Because the same basic methods
were used, it should come as no surprise that the same basic an-
76. Id. at 129.
77. Id. at 131.
78. See Saks, supra note 7, at 1179 n.89 (citing CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASS'N & CALIFORNIA
Hosp. Ass'N, REPORT ON THE MEDICAL INSURANCE FEAsmLrrY STUDY (Don H. Mills ed.,
1977)).
79. WEu.ER ET AL., supra note 1, at 43. Recall that the study under review found one
percent. Id.
80. LEON S. POCINCKI ET AL., US. DEP'T HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. No. (05) 89, THE
INCIDENCE OF IATROGENIC INJURIES: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE 50 (1973).
81. Id. at 50 (using data obtained from a sample of 23,750 patients discharged in 1972
from two large urban hospitals).
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swers were obtained. If the method has systemic errors, then all
three studies might be producing the same miscount. There are
several reasons to suspect that the number of injurious medical er-
rors is greater, perhaps far greater, than the pumber found by
these studies, including the Harvard Medical Practice Study 8 2
If the initial stages of medical record screening picked up an ad-
verse event that was not an adverse event, or attributed negligence
to cases in which none existed, that false positive error had several
opportunities to be weeded out,83 much as in the litigation process
itself. But false negatives-negligent or nonnegligent medical inju-
ries that are overlooked-are likely to remain uncounted. The
Harvard researchers conducted a study within their study and
found that the medical records screeners missed one in two hun-
dred adverse events.8 4 Second, by design the study focused on hos-
pital inpatients and largely ignored outpatient medical accidents.8 5
Third, medical treatments that are given successfully but unneces-
sarily-such as "successful" coronary bypass surgery for patients
who do not need its6-would not be captured at all by the study
under review. Yet such inappropriate treatment is at least
negligent.
Finally, and most importantly, the study assumed that the es-
sential information needed to count medical injuries and negli-
gence was in the medical records.87 A very recent study tested that
assumption by having researchers accompany doctors at a hospital
and then compare what was observed to what was recorded in
82. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 14.
83. See, e.g., WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 44.
84. Id. at 37.
85. Id. at 31. In some of the institutions outpatient records were available. Id. at 41.
86. Constance M. Winslow et al., The Appropriateness of Performing Coronary Artery
Bypass Surgery, 260 JAMA 505, 507 (1988) (finding that, in a study of 386 patients, 56% of
bypass surgeries were appropriate, 30% equivocal, and 14% inappropriate). Similar findings
exist for other treatments. See, e.g., The Appropriateness of Carotid Endarterectomy, 318
NEw ENG. J. MED. 721 (1988) (finding that, in a study of 1302 patients, 32% of carotid
endarterectomies were inappropriate).
87. The book mentions this as a potential problem, common to studies of medical records,
but the authors do not assess their own study's vulnerability to it. Sometimes the record's
incompleteness would be deliberate in order to hide an error. See infra note 89 and accom-
panying text. Other times the omission from the record and the maltreatment may have
resulted from the very same cause: the doctor did not realize that what was being done was
wrong or missed the problem. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 37.
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medical records and incident reports.88 Given the importance of
medical records not only to patients but to the welfare of physi-
cians and other hospital staff, it should not be surprising to find
the records being manipulated." The Andrews study found that
about four times as many negligent injuries occurred as were re-
corded. 0 Any such discrepancy between what happens to patients
and what is reflected in their medical records has major implica-
tions for virtually every aspect of the work under review. For ex-
ample, it may mean that the study's estimation of 150,000 deaths
nationally is m reality several times that number, and places into
doubt the cost estimates of the authors' no-fault plan.
Whatever the correct number may be for New York State, the
study's extrapolations to national death and serious injury esti-
mates are rough approximations, calculated simply by increasing
the New York medical accident data by the ratio of the nation's
population to New York's population. 1 The actual national figures
might be less or more than suggested by the book. For example, if
New Yorkers have greater access to hospitalization than the rest of
the country, then the national total of medical accidents would be
lower than a simple population adjustment would yield. On the
other hand, if New York doctors tend to give more error-free care,
then the national totals might be higher than the estimates offered
in the book.
88. Lori Andrews, Medical Error and Patient Claiming m a Hospital Setting 10 (May 30,
1993) (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the Law & Society Associa-
tion, on file with the William and Mary Law Review).
89. Id. at 11. Sometimes important and inculpatory information inadvertently may not be
recorded. On the other hand, there have been documented instances of the fraudulent alter-
ation of medical records to conceal malpractice. See John J. Harris & Don H. Mills, Medical
Records and the Questioned Document Examiner, 8 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 453 (1963) (reporting
several cases of alteration and falsification of medical records used in litigation). The more
that hospital records come to be used to cast light on the general phenomena, m addition to
their use in litigation, the more likely the records are to be the target of systematic distor-
tion. Thus, an apparent decrease m adverse events or negligence over time could mean less
medical malpractice, or it could mean improved skill at concealment.
90. Andrews, supra note 88, at figure 6.
91. WEiLER FTr AL., supra note 1, at 137.
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PUTTING MEDICAL ACCIDENTS INTO PERSPECTIVE
Whatever the level of injury is actually, and however crushing
those harms may be personally or financially to victims and their
families, the reader should bear in mind that from both a public
health and a compensation perspective these numbers are not
quite as devastating as they may appear. On average, lost years of
work or life, and the sums of money associated with these, are no
doubt far less for victims of medical malpractice than for victims
of other kinds of torts.92 Most victims of most other torts are rela-
tively young and healthy before their accidents. Many victims of
medical malpractice already are suffering serious illness or injury
for which they have sought medical treatment. Some medical acci-
dents may shorten the patient's life by only days or hours. In that
event, while the death is still wrongful, the compensable damages
will be small. Moreover, negligent injuries produce disproportion-
ately more deaths, and therefore lower costs, than nonnegligent m-
juries, which are more likely to lead to long-term medical costs.9"
Thus, although the number of people affected by malpractice is
staggering, the translation into economic losses is greatly
attenuated. 4
BEYOND STATISTICS
The Harvard Medical Practice Study is admirable for its
thoughtful research design, its systematic collection of extensive
empirical data, its careful analysis (often using alternative ap-
proaches to see if they converged on the same answer), and its so-
ber report of quantitative findings. These virtues may also be
weaknesses. While quantitative data and statistical analysis open a
window to knowledge that cannot otherwise be gained, at the same
time aggregate numbers and careful analysis leave many readers
and listeners a bit cold and uncomprehending. Likely, that is why
92. Id. at 97.
93. Id.
94. This may be evident in the pattern of litigation behavior: "[N]early 80 percent of
the patients who suffered a negligent injury but did not sue were either fully recovered from
the injury within six months or were more than 70 years old when the injury occurred [and
therefore had little or no loss of income]." Id. at 70.
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anecdote writers 5 have had as much impact on policy as they
have, even though many of their conclusions cannot find support
in more systematic evidence."6 Because serious scholars, among
them the Harvard Study's authors, know how meaningless anec-
dotes are for answering virtually all of the issues in the litigation
policy debates, they tend to eschew anecdotes altogether. In doing
so they may give up too much to the storytellers.9 7
Moreover, a reader of A Measure of Malpractice can still won-
der what the hospital records analysts looked at and how they
judged injuries to be "adverse" or "negligent." I would not blame
doctors who remained unconvinced unless and until they could see
the details of the cases and satisfy themselves as to the injuries
and errors. Indeed, because medical malpractice is a relatively rare
event,9 s doctors will see fewer of them than the lawyers whose
work requires them to see concentrations of such cases.99 As far as
I am aware, no published source brings together the concrete fac-
tual details of a representative sample of such cases. Such case ex-
amples would provide a kind of information that is not now
available.
At the University of Iowa, the National Maternal and Child
Health Resource Center conducted an analysis of 178 pediatric
medical malpractice cases they were able to find through an exten-
sive search of law reporters. 00 A co-director of the project, Dr.
John MacQueen,' 0 ' has said that when he began the project he was
95. E.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988) (purporting to chronicle a recent dramatic increase in litigation and its negative con-
sequences); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991) (arguing that recent changes in liability law have benefitted
lawyers almost exclusively).
96. See Saks, supra note 7, at 1242.
97. For an effective presentation of data and representative case descriptions, see SULLI-
VAN ET AL., supra note 12.
98. Recall, according to the present study, there is only one malpractice victim per 100
hospital discharges. WELER ET AL., supra note 1, at 43.
99. This group of lawyers includes hospital lawyers, insurance company lawyers, plain-
tiffs' lawyers, and defense lawyers.
100. JOHN C. MACQUEEN & DAVID BALDUS, DEP'T OF PEDIATRICS AND COLLEGE OF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, A STUDY OF MEDICAL DISABILITY CASES AND DAMAGES (1993) (on file
with the William and Mary Law Review).
101. Dr. MacQueen, a pediatric neurologist, is director of the University of Iowa National
Maternal and Child Health Resources Center, Professor of Pediatrics Emeritus at the Uni-
versity of Iowa College of Medicine, former director of the State of Iowa Program for Chil-
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indignant about lawsuits being brought against doctors and hospi-
tals, and shared the same beliefs (disbeliefs, really) that many
other doctors held. But after reading the actual cases, his attitude
changed to one of shock at what some of his colleagues were doing.
He concluded that a large proportion of the pediatric cases re-
viewed involved what would be regarded by most physicians as
gross errors in medical care. 02 He also concluded, however, that in
a significant, albeit smaller, proportion of cases physicians were pe-
nalized for injuries that were probably unavoidable under the cir-
cumstances or were related to medical judgments that were not
clearly unreasonable. 0 3 The authors of the report provided a quan-
titative summary of the various errors'04 and injuries," 5 but be-
lieved that they could convey the real nature of the accidents only
by providing concrete descriptions of representative cases.16
dren with Special Health Care Needs, and past president of the American Academy of
Pediatrics.
102. MACQUEEN & BALDUS, supra note 100, at 15. Having gone to trial and appeal, these
cases presumably are the more ambiguous and less glaring. One would expect the most out-
rageous cases to have been settled.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 27, Chart F Chart F demonstrates the proportion of errors due to failure to
diagnose, delay of diagnosis, improper performance of surgery, improper performance of
treatment, mistaken diagnosis including misinterpretation of diagnostic test, improper per-
formance of diagnostic test, wrong drug ordered, wrong dosage ordered, wrong drug given,
wrong dosage given, improper choice of delivery method, improper choice of treatment, etc.
105. Id. at 44, Chart L. Chart L demonstrates the proportion of injuries causing neurolog-
ical impairment, brain function impairment, neuromuscular impairment, impairment in
physical appearance, neurosensory impairment, impairment in body function, skeletal im-
pairment, skin impairment, renal impairment, reproductive dysfunction, etc.
106. Id. at 14-29. Although the news media eagerly publish anecdotal case reports, few
scholarly journals are eager to do so. That division of contents and outlets seems likely to
have affected the public's and policymakers' perception of the facts.
Lest I commit the same omission as I am discussing, let me provide an edited summary of
one of MacQueen and Baldus' summaries:
Injury Type: 3: INTRACRANIAL INJURY
Case Name: Hoskie v. United States, 666 F.2d 1353 (10th Cir. 1981)
On August 17, 1977, the two-and-one-half-year-old male plaintiff entered a
federal government medical facility for a routine bronchoscopy to remove a
lodged sunflower seed. During the course of treatment, plaintiff was given an
injection of 10 milligrams of morphine as a sedative, a dose several times that
recommended by accepted pediatric authorities for a child of his age and
weight. Within a few hours, he lapsed into a coma and remained unresponsive
for several days. When he gradually emerged from unconsciousness, it was de-
termined that the overdose of morphine had depressed his breathing function,
depriving his brain of oxygen and causing permanent brain damage.
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Counting such cases is fine, but sometimes readers need to be
given a more concrete sense of what is being counted.
How "ACCURATE" IS THE TORT SYSTEM?
Do malpractice claims accurately target instances of negligent
injury, or are they random and unpredictable, as likely to be
brought against physicians who did not commit malpractice as
those who did injure a patient negligently 9 This aspect of the con-
ventional tort system should make a difference for both our assess-
ment of the justice of the system and its likely deterrent effect. On
this topic, the author(s) of one chapter of A Measure of Malprac-
tice does not quite seem to have grasped what the author(s) of an-
other chapter wrote. 107
The chapter on deterrence, Chapter 6, comments:
[I]n terms of absolute numbers more claims are filed against
careful than against careless doctors. To reiterate the analogy
from [Chapter 4], one cannot assume that a legal regime that
gives out more traffic tickets to drivers going through an inter-
section on the green than on the red light will serve as an effec-
tive deterrent against drivers going through on the red.10 8
Before entering the medical facility, the plaintiff was a healthy, normal, well-
coordinated child who could walk, speak in sentences, ride a tricycle, and was
toilet-trained. He now suffers from spasticity; rigidness; impaired hand-eye co-
ordination, balance, and other motor skills; impaired speech and vision; mental
retardation (I.Q. under 50); and has suffered convulsions. He walks with a
spastic gait, even with aid of leg braces. He cannot run, ride a tricycle, or play
elementary sports. At age four-and-one-half, he cannot speak clearly and is no
longer toilet-trained. Although his condition may improve gradually, he will
remain mentally retarded. He will require some form of supervision for the rest
of his life. His life expectancy is over 60 years. The plaintiff sought $1,000,000
pain and suffering. The trial court awarded plaintiff total compensatory dam-
ages of $231,000 consisting of $206,000 in special damages and $25,000 in gen-
eral damages. Plaintiff's mother was awarded $5,000 in lost wages.
Plaintiff appealed the damages award. The appellate court reversed and re-
manded the pain and suffering award, and affirmed the remainder of the ver-
dict. On remand, the trial judge awarded $1,000,000 pain and suffering.
MACQUEEN & BALDUS, supra note 100, at 20.
107. The problem may be that a phenomenon obvious to biostatisticians or epidemiolo-
gists (who, I suspect, wrote Chapter 4) may not be so familiar to econometricians (who obvi-
ously wrote Chapter 6), and vice versa for other issues.
108. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 115-16.
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Chapter 4 makes quite a different point. It takes pains to go be-
yond the raw numbers and to deal in more meaningful
probabilities:
[W]hile the absolute number of unfounded claims is considera-
bly larger than the absolute number of valid claims, the pattern
shows that the chances that any one doctor will be sued are
far greater if negligent treatment has occurred than if it has not.
To return to our traffic analogy, even though more drivers may
be ticketed by police after going through green than red lights,
the reason is that far more drivers go through green lights in the
first place. With that difference controlled for, the odds that a
careless driver will get a ticket, or that a careless doctor will be
sued, are far greater than the odds faced by their careful
counterparts. I °9
A glance back at Table 2 of this book review should clarify the
point.110 The number of cases in which no negligent adverse event
occurred vastly outnumbers the negligent injuries (about one hun-
dred to one), and even a ninety-nine percent accurate system
would produce more invalid than valid filings on so skewed a dis-
tribution."' This problem is regularly faced in biomedical testing,
and therefore should present no surprise or confusion to the medi-
cal profession."
Thus, in the legal context as well, false positives can outnumber
true positives (by five times, based on the data in Table 2). Yet at
the same time, the system targets negligent injuries with sufficient
accuracy that a doctor who causes a negligent injury stands a far
109. Id. at 75. The quotation continues: "As we shall see in Chapter 6, however cloudy the
malpractice signal might appear to doctors, both the reality and the perception of that sig-
nal have a pronounced tilt in the proper direction." Id. at 75-76.
110. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
111. If patient filings were 99% accurate, given the basic data in the margins of Table 2,
there would be 277 true positive filings and 298 false positive filings. See supra Table 2.
112. HIV screening provides an example. Though the test is 97.7% accurate, because the
population distribution of HIV infections is about 250 uninfected to each one infected, m a
screening of the population the test would make about 19 false positive errors for every true
positive found, so that a positive test result would mean one had about a five percent chance
of actually being infected with HIV Stanley H. Weiss et al., Screening Test for HTLV-III
(AIDS Agent) Antibodies, 253 JAMA 221, 224 (1985); see also Joseph L. Gastwirth, The
Statistical Precision of Medical Screening Procedures: Application to Polygraph and AIDS
Antibodies Test Data, 2 STAT. ScI. 213, 216 (1987) (showing that the ratio of false positives
to true positives rises as the prevalence of the condition in the sample declines).
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greater chance of being claimed against than one who has not (bet-
ter than twenty-two to one odds).
Both of these dramatic and important facts about malpractice
litigation are overshadowed by a third fact, which perhaps has the
greatest bearing on the system's level of deterrence. Underlying
the odds in the preceding paragraph are the probabilities of be-
coming a defendant at all. That twenty-two to one ratio comes
from a probability of being sued given a negligent injury of .029
and a probability of being sued given no negligent injury of .0013.
Although the authors of A Measure of Malpractice conclude
that "the legal system does in fact operate erratically," 113 a closer
look at the data seems to suggest that the legal process, even at the
initial filing stage, is remarkably accurate.
First of all, though the authors use the words "legal system" in
their discussion of these data, they really are talking only-about
filings, which merely initiate the legal process. Any system would
require filings, some of which would be made in error. Indeed, the
Harvard group's preferred administrative system undoubtedly
would produce a far higher rate of erroneous filings, because those
filings would be made directly by patients without the benefit of
pre-screening by an attorney and the attorney's consulting
physician. 114
The authors' statement that "the legal system does in fact oper-
ate erratically" is based on the finding that only eight of the forty-
seven filed claims were filed by patients who had suffered negligent
medical injuries, according to the study's medical records review.
Without going beyond the assumptions and data of the study it-
self,1 5 let us consider more carefully how false those thirty-nine
false positives really are. Although in the final analysis, the study
judged these false positives not to be negligent adverse events,
113. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 73.
114. Whatever incentive attorneys have to file cases that appear meritorious, and sanc-
tions they face for filing groundless claims, would not operate on patients who, unlike attor-
neys, have nothing to lose from filling out whatever forms would be required in a no-fault
system. Evidence suggests that attorneys turn away many cases brought to them by pro-
spective plaintiffs. See Saks, supra note 7, at 1190-93 (discussing what decisions get made at
various stages of the legal process).
115. That is, without positing negligent injuries missed by the researchers or unnecessary
medical treatments, etc., but simply considering the authors' own data at face value.
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most of them had various indicia of being such, or at least of being
adverse events. The medical records analysts referred all but
twelve of them as possible adverse events. At the next level of re-
view, the referred cases involved considerable disagreement among
the physicians as to whether an adverse event had occurred and, if
so, whether negligence had caused those adverse events.1 ,
Of the thirty-nine false positives among the 29,841 cases judged
by the study not to have involved negligent injury, only twelve ap-
peared to have no basis. Of the rest, fifteen to eighteen patients
were found to have suffered adverse events and seven were thought
by at least one of two reviewing doctors to be the victims of negli-
gent injury In all, thirty-five of the forty-seven patients who filed
claims had at least some real basis (confirmed by the Harvard re-
viewers) for thinking they had a valid clam.117
This analysis seems to reveal patient-claiming behavior that
hardly is "erratic." The odds of a patient filing a claim without any
basis, without a hint of an adverse event, appear to be about four
in 10,000.118 This pattern does not represent random or haphazard
filings, but for the most part looks like the problem of resolving
genuine ambiguity Treatment outcomes that involve trauma or
dysfunction are difficult for patients, lawyers, and sometimes even
doctors to sort into "adverse events" versus "not unexpected." In
turn, adverse events are not always easy to sort into "negligent"
and "nonnegligent." If within the study the ambiguity had to be
resolved by higher and higher levels of review, it is not surprising
that within the legal system initial filings take some review, negoti-
116. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 72, Table 4.2. Of 14 cases referred as possible
adverse events, five were judged by at least one of the two reviewing doctors to be an ad-
verse event. Id. Of the three cases referred as low threshold adverse events, one of them was
judged by one of the reviewing physicians to be due to negligence. Id. Of 10 adverse events
ultimately judged not to involve negligence, six of them were judged by one of two reviewing
doctors to involve negligence. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. There were 12 baseless claims in the sample of 30,121. Recall that even by the
study's own deceptively bright lines (treating its own resolved ambiguities as "true negligent
injuries" versus "unwarranted" or "groundless" suits), the study found the yearly odds to be
only about one in 1,000 that a doctor who did not cause a negligent injury would become the
subject of a filed malpractice claim. Id. Clearly, a patient is not lurking around every comer
hungering for the chance to sue.
[Vol. 35:693
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ation, and occasionally119 a trial to resolve. 120 Medical injury is
probably the most factually ambiguous kind of tort. Most injured
patients do not bring a claim until after they have gone through a
period of extensive consultation with others, often doctors.121
Many such patients resolve their ambiguity in favor of the putative
injurer and do not file.
MEASURING TORT LAW'S DETERRENT EFFECT
The deterrent effect of tort law is important because without
that justification one would be hard pressed to defend the system's
existence.122 Its transaction costs are so high and its compensation
effectiveness so low that it would be relatively easy to find a re-
placement for the tort system that could provide more equitable
compensation for the innocent victims of latrogenic injury Thus, a
proper attempt to assess tort law's deterrent impact, if any, is
worthwhile. 23
Until now, one could do little more than point to legal, psycho-
logical, or economic theory, 24 or indirect data showing that physi-
cians have both a dread of malpractice suits and an exaggerated
estimation of their frequency of occurrence.125 But no direct empir-
ical evidence existed (ideally including an estimate of its relative
value as a component of the system).
The authors claim that "[t]he Harvard Medical Practice Study
constituted the first-ever attempt to develop tangible evidence of
119. On average, one trial takes place for every 10 filings. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Adju-
dication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 161-62 (1986).
120. See Saks, supra note 7, at 1226 (finding evidence that in each successive stage of the
legal process the ratio of true positives to false positives improves).
121. May, supra note 29, at 7.
122. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
24-33 (1970) (discussing the goals and sub-goals of tort law).
123. Given this importance, it is curious that the final chapter proposes its no-fault sys-
tem without making allowance for the loss of deterrence. The immediately preceding chap-
ter tentatively concludes a deterrent effect exists under current malpractice law, and is po-
tent enough to justify the additional cost of the tort system. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at
134.
124. They all make the same point: increased sanctions, punishment, or costs, respec-
tively, should reduce the behavior with which those aversive events are associated.
125. Physicians' misperception of the severity and frequency of claims, however, may be
just the right thing to offset the infrequency of filings and the greater infrequency of plain-
tiff success, even when negligent injury did indeed occur.
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whether malpractice litigation reduces medical injuries. ' ' 12' The
methodological challenge was enormous, but the design of the
study was never up to the task. To their credit, those who worked
on this portion of the analysis were smart enough to see clearly the
problems they faced; many less capable researchers would not have
seen them. Nevertheless, they had little or no hope of escaping the
limitations of the research design and were forced to equivocate
their way through their chapter.
Here are some of their problems. How do you show that mal-
practice litigation causes a decrease in malpractice injuries?
Straightforward correlations between the two do not allow you to
distinguish the cause from the effect, nor to tease apart the recip-
rocal contributions of two things that really are working together:
more malpractice leads to more malpractice litigation which theo-
retically, at least, leads to less malpractice. 17 At a minimum, one
would think, to separate these effects, one needs to compare set-
tings that differ only by the level of litigation experienced, that is,
experimental and control conditions. Alternatively, one could com-
pare measures at two points in time. Thus, by looking at the pat-
tern of relationships between malpractice injuries and malpractice
claims at time, and malpractice injuries and malpractice claims at
time2, you may be able to draw defensible inferences about causa-
tion, because causes precede their effects.'2  But the Harvard
Study data were from only one state in only one year.
A second major problem is that the measure of sanction (the
number of claims per negligent injuries) and the measure of mal-
practice (the number of negligent injuries per patients) both con-
tain one of the same ingredients, which unfortunately is in the de-
nominator of one measure and the numerator of the other. That
means that any error in measurement-and there is always error in
126. WELER ET AL., supra note 1, at 131.
127. Suppose the correlation is positive: high rates of malpractice are associated with high
rates of malpractice claims. Does that refute deterrence theory, which says high litigation
rates should cause low malpractice rates? Or does it simply mean that malpractice is being
responded to with malpractice suits? Suppose the correlation is zero. Does that refute the
theory or does it reflect a canceling out of the countervailing effects?
128. The research design described in this sentence is called a cross-lagged panel correla-
tion. See THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN &
ANALYSIS FOR FIELD SETTINGs 309-20 (1979).
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all measurement-would tend to produce a spurious correlation.
The greater the measurement error, the more it would appear that
a deterrent effect existed.
Well aware of these problems, the researchers attempted to get
around them. They tried to harness variations in intensity of litiga-
tion in different regions of the state and different hospitals and to
build complex variables that would help control for extraneous,
confounding, differences between those jurisdictions. 129 In place of
negligent injuries, for one of the measures, they built a proxy vari-
able out of predictors of malpractice. 30 My misgivings about these
efforts are that they build assumptions upon assumptions built on
assumptions. And they rely on beta-weight magic to make all of
the adjustments that need to be made if the effects of interest are
to be seen with any clarity
The deterrence analysis appears to be an afterthought. Had the
researchers seen it as an important part of the study from the out-
set, one might expect that the design would have chosen two
points in time, say five years apart, and done half the data collec-
tion in each of the two years. Then one would have a measure of
any real trend in malpractice or litigation or both, and be able to
carry out a more convincing test for deterrent effects.
In the end, the effect is declared simultaneously to exist, "we did
observe the hypothesized relationship in our sample-the more
tort claims, the fewer negligent injuries,"''1 and not to exist, due to
the authors' own misgivings about their analysis: "[W]e cannot ex-
clude the possibility that this relationship was coincidental rather
than causal."' 2
Other sections of the book, by the way, also treat statistically
nonsignificant differences as if they exist but have failed to pass
some higher test of reality 13 This misses the whole point of signif-
icance testing. Significance testing asks the question: Have we used
a large enough sample that we can rule out the possibility that ap-
129. WEILER Er AL., supra note 1, at 139-41.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 129.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., id. at 51 ("Hospitals with more than 80 percent minority discharges had
adverse event rates of 3.7 percent, which was higher than in predominantly white hospitals,
but not significantly so.").
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parent differences are due to nothing more than sampling or mea-
surement error 9 A difference that is not "significant" is not a dif-
ference at all, it's just noise. So when the book speaks of "non-
significant differences" as if they are differences, it is uttering
nonsense.
With respect to the deterrent effect of tort law, we alternately
are told that it exists and that it does not exist. "Our best estimate
is that the more malpractice suits that are brought against the
doctors and other providers in a particular hospital, the fewer the
number of negligent medical injuries that will be suffered by pa-
tients in that hospital."'134 Next, however, the reader is told that
"this result did not reach the conventional level of statistical sig-
nificance and thence scientific demonstration.' 1 35 Then we learn
how much "the current level of litigation intensity" was reducing
the negligent injury rate,136 but are reminded that "these injury
prevention estimates have no more statistical significance than the
point estimate from which they were translated.' ' 3 7
The authors make an argument, of sorts, that the conventional
level of statistical significance is inappropriate and unwise in some
decisionmaking applications, tort policy being among them, and
therefore we need not rigidly insist on a significance level of .05.' s3
Their argument could be a persuasive one.'39 But if the authors are
serious about that, they (1) should not have told us repeatedly that
the results did not reach conventional significance, (2) should have
told us the probability of erroneous rejection of the null hypothesis
of no-deterrent-effect that was found by their data, so that readers
and reformers could have some chance of weighing the risks they
are being asked to run, 4 ° and (3) perhaps should have offered
134. Id. at 129.
135. Id. (footnote omitted).
136. Id. at 131.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 131-33.
139. I have made it myself on occasion. See MICHAEL J. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS: THE ROLE
OF GROUP SIZE AND SociAL DECISION RULE 73-76 (1977) (arguing that, in a study of differ-
ences in decisions made by juries of various sizes, a 10% level of significance is appropriate
because an erroneous finding that no differences exist could endanger the rights of
defendants).
140. "[W]e believe that for purposes of practical policy-making, the safest course is to
accept the indication that malpractice litigation does have an injury prevention effect,
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analysis and arguments concerning what the sensible risks of Type
I and Type II error should be in this context. 141 While I have heard
of authors wanting to have it both ways, these authors do not want
it either way
No-FAULT MALPRACTICE COMPENSATION
As noted earlier, A Measure of Malpractice proposes a system of
no-fault compensation for a subgroup of malpractice victims and a
subset of their losses. 142 The final chapter of the book offers an
additional, enabling proposal: To introduce the plan with legisla-
tion that merely permits patients the voluntary option of foregoing
the right to sue in return for no-fault coverage that would pay
100% of medical costs and 80% of lost earnings (up to 200% of
their state's average earnihgs level) that are occasioned by a medi-
cal injury and nothing for pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of
life.' 43
The proposal has at least one conspicuous virtue over the cus-
tomary malpractice reforms. The principal "successful" malprac-
tice law reform in the states has been to cap the amount of dam-
ages for pain and suffering (and sometimes for all losses) that
plaintiffs may be awarded. 4 4 I say "successful" because it is one of
the few reforms that actually has had a measurable impact. 45 But
its savings are achieved by limiting only the compensation of the
most gravely injured patients, who also are most likely already to
be the most seriously undercompensated, while allowing those at
the lower end of the loss spectrum to enjoy windfalls un-
however statistically fragile the specific point estimate might be." WEILER ET AL., supra note
1, at 132. How do they know that would be the practical lesson from their data? Why do
they themselves disregard the lesson when they do their own policy-proposing? I would like
an answer that goes deeper than the fact that some authors wrote some chapters and other,
authors wrote other chapters.
141. Type I error is the risk of erroneously concluding that an effect exists when in reality
it does not; Type H error is the risk of erroneously concluding that no effect exists when in
fact one does.
142. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
143. WEiLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 151-52.
144. Caps have also been proposed at the federal level. See Shirley Qual, A Survey of
Medical Malpractice Tort Reform, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 417, 434 (1986); President
Offers Congress a Medical Malpractice Reform Bill, LiABiUrry WIL, July 6, 1992.
145. See Mitchell S. Berger, Note, Following the Doctor's Orders-Caps on Non-Eco-
nomic Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 173, 187 (1990).
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molested.14 Caps are a cruel and perverse solution. 147 By contrast,
the Harvard Study's no-fault proposal finds its cost savings where
they will do less harm, taking from the least, rather than the most,
severely injured malpractice victims.
The principal questions to be asked about a no-fault proposal
are whether it is economically feasible, whether it loses tort law's
deterrent function, and whether it is just.
A Measure of Malpractice goes to considerable lengths to test
whether the no-fault proposal is economically viable, and con-
cludes that it is.' 48 This conclusion differs from that of the major
predecessor study, the California Medical Association and Califor-
nia Hospital Association study,'4 carried out in the 1970's for the
same purpose of trying to determine whether a no-fault compensa-
tion system would be feasible. The earlier study concluded that the
proportion of claims brought was so small relative to the incidence
of medical injury that the existing tort system placed doctors and
hospitals in a better financial position than a no-fault system
would. 50 The current study reaches a different conclusion because
it found the gap between injuries and claims to be somewhat
smaller and because it has been more clever at limiting who would
be covered and for what losses. If the incidence of medical injury is
much greater than found by the Harvard Study, then the cost esti-
mates may have to be adjusted upward.' 5 '
As to deterrence I will say only this: Not only is the study's de-
terrence analysis its most brittle component methodologically,' 2
but it is cast in almost exclusively economic terms, which in the
malpractice context likely is an error. For example, the book notes
146. The most common finding from studies of tort compensation is that people with
relatively small losses tend to be overcompensated several times over, while those whose
losses are large on average receive far less than a dollar of compensation for every dollar of
loss. See Saks, supra note 7, at 1271-80.
147. Sensible alternatives exist, such as comparative review of cases for purposes of guid-
ing additur and remittitur decisions. See DAVID BALDUS E'r AL., STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE,
IMPROVING JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF JURY DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS: A PROPOSAL FOR THE COMPAR-
ATIVE ADDITUR/REMITTITUR REVIEW OF AWARDS FOR NONPECUNIARY HARMS AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGES (1993).
148. WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 146.
149. Id. at 78.
150. Id.
151. See Andrews, supra note 88 (suggesting considerable adjustment may be necessary).
152. See supra notes 128-43 and accompanying text.
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that because malpractice insurance is not experience rated, so that
all doctors of the same specialty in the same geographic region
with the same company pay the same premiums, liability insurance
lacks a financial deterrent threat.153 But in tort law, perhaps the
process is the punishment. 5 4 And as the data of this study show,
negligent errors are far more likely to result in legal action than
nonnegligent errors.155 Ergo, the claim itself may be the deterrent.
Is the proposed no-fault scheme just? I do not believe I am un-
fairly characterizing A Measure of Malpractice when I say that it
essentially dismisses notions of corrective justice as too old-fash-
ioned to bother with anymore.1 56 But it is not hard to imagine doc-
tors asking why they should be "responsible" for adverse events
which may have occurred as a "result" of their care but which were
not their "fault." The answer is simple pragmatism. The best way
to avoid the need for hearings and trials is to eliminate the most
difficult question: Whether the care given was negligent. If all
medically caused injuries are compensated, it would be far easier
for case by case decisions to be made administratively Such a sys-
tem might save money And doctors would gain what in their heart
of hearts they long for most, namely, escape from lawyers. A prag-
matic quid pro quo. But it may not satisfy doctors' intuitions
about justice.
Innocent victims of someone else's negligence, who happen to be
excluded by the six-month deductible period, might ask why the
losses they have suffered are to be left on them (or the taxpayers
may ask why it should be passed to them). The basic answer is
that to save money someone has to be left out, and those who re-
cover from their injuries within six months are among the more
able to cope with the burden.157 Seriously injured malpractice vic-
153. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 114-15.
154. The comparable point has been made for the criminal law. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY,
THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979); see also PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON
TIAL (1991).
155. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
156. "[T]he value of individualistic corrective justice as a guiding norm for medical liabil-
ity is no longer very relevant in a world in which the burden of liability is distributed to the
broader community through the interplay of malpractice insurance and health care insur-
ance." WEILER ET AL., supra note 1, at 78.
157. Moreover, those with the smallest losses are most likely to be overcompensated by
the current system. See supra note 59.
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tims earning over $60,000 annually'5" might ask why they and their
families, the innocent victims of someone else's mistake, should
have to lose income, perhaps permanently, perhaps along with
their homes, while the people whose negligence caused their catas-
trophes should be put to no trouble at all. Victims, rich or poor, of
serious malpractice injuries might ask why their suffering and the
massive disability imposed on them should be valued at zero. 159
The answers are pragmatic and long familiar to students of tort
law and its alternatives. Under the tort system so few victims
would receive even that much, most nothing at all; only propor-
tionately few of you would win substantial sums and occasionally
windfalls; and by saving on transaction costs we can put more of
the money to work for injury victims. No-fault can deliver im-
proved distributive justice, but does so by placing explicit limita-
tions on who can receive what. Tort law promises to "make whole"
the victims of negligent injury, but that is a promise that in prac-
tice it has never come close to keeping. Tort law's aspirations come
closer to satisfying one's sense of justice, but it fails miserably in
the performance, at least with respect to compensation. No-fault
offers only compromises, but is candid about them.
POLICY ANALYSIS
The book makes a specific proposal for new legal policy in the
malpractice area, tests its proposal against the data gathered, and
concludes that its alternative is both feasible and superior to cur-
rent tort law, at least with respect to compensation. I think the
data in this book have a higher calling than that.
Policy proposals of various kinds exist and still more will come
into being once policymakers and the public realize they have been
obsessing about only one side of the problem, and that one being
by far the less tragic side. 60 Not only are there many proposals,
there are numerous variables to be maximized (or minimized) and
158. Sixty thousand dollars is double the approximate mean income for all U.S. families.
See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1992, at No.
695 (112th ed. 1992).
159. Zero value means no compensation for pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life.
Consider the case summarized, supra note 106.
160. In that the system's injustices to negligently injured patients far exceed its injustices
to doctors and hospitals.
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some of those variables no doubt are more important than
others. 6M The goal ought not to be to find an improvement, but to
design a system that makes the best trade-offs and maximizes
overall utility
Techniques exist for conducting these more comprehensive pol-
icy analyses.16 2 The body of serious studies that have been accumu-
lating on the subject of malpractice, the Harvard Medical Practice
Study prominent among them, should be placed into wider analy-
sis so that comparisons may be made among the full range of pro-
posals. When we are ready for real malpractice reform, let us try to
find the best one that can be found.
CONCLUSION: LEARNING FROM EVIDENCE
My various criticisms loom quite small in making a balanced as-
sessment of the book under review and the work that it reports.
The book is a major contribution to understanding the extent of
medical malpractice, whom it affects, at what cost, with what re-
sponse, and what we can do to improve matters.
The study's findings strongly suggest that the problem of mal-
practice1 63 is considerably more serious than the problem of mal-
practice litigation.1 6 4 Indeed, it makes more sense to see the in-
crease in litigation as an overdue response to a real problem:
"[T]he steady increase in claims frequency and severity re-
flects merely a partial closing of the large gap between potential
161. The obvious ones are compensation and deterrence. Other variables may include
transaction costs, transparency of the system's logic, and procedural justice.
162. One such technique is multi-attribute utility analysis. For a discussion of this tech-
nique, see Ward Edwards et al., A Decision-Theoretic Approach to Evaluation Research, in
1 HANDBOOK OF EVALUATION RESEARCH 139-81 (Elmer L. Streunmg & Marcia Guttentag eds.,
1975).
163.
Hospital patients face a considerable chance of being hurt as a result of negli-
gent treatment by doctors and other providers, and an even greater risk of
injury from non-negligent medical intervention. The hospital record review
highlights the urgent need for greater quality assurance efforts within the
health care system
WE LER ET AL., supra note 1, at 61.
164. "[T]he underlying assumption that too many groundless malpractice suits are miti-
ated is unfounded." Id. at 137.
1994]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
and actual malpractice claims, not an inordinate level of litigation
inflicted by the law on the medical system. "165
Whatever reforms might be proposed in the light of such data
would all share at least one common aspect: They would be a ma-
jor reversal from the malpractice reforms that have been pursued
over the past two decades, reforms which aim to restrict the cure
rather than the ailment.
This and other research that has been conducted on this topic,
virtually all of which points in the same direction, eventually may
require all of us to ask a larger question: Are we, as a society, capa-
ble of learning from serious evidence about the real world we live
in, or do our laws, policies, and practices flow from whatever illu-
sions the most influential interest groups promote?
The authors began with sharp and monotonously familiar differ-
ences of opinion, but committed themselves to "more informed
analysis and less fervent conviction."' 6 In the face of the data they
gathered, they came together around a common, well informed pol-
icy proposal. Perhaps the rest of us can do so as well.
165. Id. at 6. "Our data make clear, then, that the focus of legislative concern should be
that the malpractice system is too inaccessible; rather than too accessible, to the victims of
negligent medical treatment." Id. at 76.
166. Id. at xiii.
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